The Vehicle: Cross-border Affinity Groups.

We have millions of people in America disgusted by the recklessness and corruption of this war, and many are willing to work to fight it. But they are offered few actions and few outlets to fight. The battle seems too great, the distance between Americans and Iraqis too insurmountable, the crashing inertia of the war too alien and powerful to oppose. In the absence of viable action, we worry over elections and hope that new leaders can divert a trainwreck. We doubt that they can fix the situation, but we have no other options.

We need a mechanism lo loose the force of all Americans willing to fight to rebuke the callous leadership of powermad leaders. We need a structure that can attack the war from a thousand directions.

That mechanism is the affinity group. We've seen its utility as a major component in anti-globalization movements around the world.

Principally, affinity groups allow us a starting point, a way to animate a moribund movement on manageable scales.

I would like to suggest a modification though. Our affinity groups should be cross-border, and each group should be comprised of Americans and Iraqis.

This is the most important aspect of this plan, and also the most difficult to manage. It requires the support of institutionalized members of the anti-war community, with enough resources and connections to encourage comunication between American and Iraqi citizens. Our flagship anti-war organizations may undertake this, as well as religious and interfaith bodies who might find this method most viable. Without their interest and support, this strategy cannot be fully enacted.

To list specific recommendations briefly:
*we work through affinity groups of no more than a dozen people
*each group includes Americans and Iraqis
*each group develops appropriate direct actions and support and communication structures
*each group includes standard affinity group offices
*larger organizations, such as interfaith bodies, unions, and flagship anti-war organizations, provide logistical support to groups, especially to insure contact between American and Iraqi members and to provide a forum for coordination of larger actions involving a variety of affinity groups
*cross-border work insures genuine, unadulterated communication between Americans and Iraqis
*American members will be responsible for helping maintain the security of their Iraqi affinity group members, in whatever ways they are possible- this is one of the chief aims of this strategy. Simple communication with an affinity group helps maintain some level of safety. American members can respond quickly within the US if members in Iraq are persecuted by police, military, militias, or sectarian groups. Iraqi members of groups can help maintain one another's security as well in the area, to whatever extent possible.
*each group should attempt to keep Iraqi members from different religious and ethnic backgrounds, to buttress up grassroots cross-denominational civil society in that country

Caveats:
*Appropriate direct actions should remain more or less legal, or nonviolent, given the possibility of unusually severe persecution by angered political officials in this sort of effort. In an effort such as this, successful international communication networks are vital. We must have the forethought to refrain from giving angry government officials any excuse to cut this communication off.

Rough Points of Unity:
*American troops must leave Iraq.
*Sectarian violence in Iraq must end, and the nation must embrace and enforce ethnic equality and safety.
*To reduce destabilization, violent efforts must be avoided.
*Iraqi resources, including and especially oil, must remain the property of the people of Iraq. Profiteering by oil and reconstruction companies must end and be redressed.

Rough Points of Honor for Affinity Groups:
*Members must treat one another with respect and dignity.
*Members must always work towards the safety of all other members.
*Decision-making must be as democratic as possible; preferably by consensus, and by a supermajority vote if consensus is not possible. If votes are taken, the votes of Iraqi members must be weighted more heavily than those of American members.